One important concern for the upcoming and highly-complex voluntary incentive auctions for broadcast television spectrum is the degree to which the largest mobile wireless providers will be allowed to participate. Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice encouraged the Federal Communications Commission to engineer the auction to favor smaller providers in an attempt to equalize competition among mobile wireless competitors. In this BULLETIN, we review the Justice Department's analysis and find significant defects. First, the DOJ's notion of "foreclosure value" is not a sufficient justification for rigging the auction. The efficiency of an auction's outcome should instead be based on relative "use value," and there are good reasons to suspect the use value of larger carriers exceeds that of smaller carriers. Economic theory therefore suggests the presumption should be in favor of non-interference. Second, we demonstrate that the DOJ's proposal is inconsistent with its own depiction of the mobile wireless market, where firms act as Cournot competitors, face spectrum exhaust, and realize a type of economies of scale in the use of spectrum. Published research shows that under such conditions, spectrum exhaust turns the standard antitrust analysis on its head-namely, that more competitors may, in fact, lead to higher prices and lower quality. Third, we show that case law holds that government intervention, whether by the FCC or the DOJ, should not be directed at equalizing competition among competitors, but the DOJ's recommendation is plainly aimed at doing so. We conclude that the Department's proposal effectively seeks to return spectrum allocation to the comparative hearing process, where government-not markets-selects deserving entities for spectrum licenses in a process disguised as an "auction" among preselected winners. www.phoenix-center.org
I. Introduction
Pursuant to the directions of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ("Spectrum Act"), 1 the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has been working out the details of a voluntary incentive auction mechanism by which the "beachfront" spectrum held by television broadcasters can be transferred to the mobile wireless broadband sector, thereby moving spectrum from a lower-to higher-value use. 2 This auction will likely prove the most complicated ever implemented, since the auction design will determine not only which firms receive spectrum but which broadcasters make their spectrum available. 3 One important concern regarding the upcoming and highly-complex auction is the degree to which the two largest mobile wireless providers (i.e., AT&T and Verizon) will be allowed to participate. While the Spectrum Act specifically prohibits the FCC from excluding eligible bidders, 4 the Commission remains free to "adopt and enforce rules of general applicability, including rules concerning spectrum aggregation that promote competition." 5 To this end, last fall the agency issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to re-evaluate, and potentially tighten, its existing "spectrum screen," an analytical tool used by the agency to analyze spectrum holdings during its review of wireless transactions. 6 The spectrum screen operates much like a soft spectrum cap. http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=c42a8c8a-52ad-44af-86b2-4695aaff5378; http://wireless.fcc.gov/incentiveauctions/learn-program/index.html. 3 Auctions, FCC 12-118, 27 FCC Rcd 12,357, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (rel. October 2, 2012) . 4 Spectrum Act, supra n. 1, Section 6404. It should be noted that FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski was a vocal proponent of auction exclusion rules. See Remarks of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, 2012 Consumer Electronics Show, Las Vegas (January 11, 2012) (it would be a "mistake" to "eliminate traditional FCC tools for setting terms for participation in auctions.") (available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-311974A1.pdf). See also B. Sasso, Former FCC Chief Rips House Spectrum Bill, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2012) (reporting that former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt was worried that the Spectrum Act would "allow the largest wireless carriers to buy up all of the spectrum at auction, expanding their dominance of the airwaves. He said the carriers might not even plan to use some of the spectrum but could buy it just to kill off competition.") (available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/207655-former-fccchief-rips-housespectrumbill).
In the Matter of Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive
In this BULLETIN, we evaluate the theoretical merits of the Justice Department's argument presented in its Ex Parte filing; in so doing, we reveal some significant defects in the Department's thinking on spectrum allocation. For example, in Section II of this BULLETIN, we address the primary thesis of the DOJ's filing-i.e., that the presence of a "foreclosure value" for large wireless carriers warrants the manipulation of the voluntary broadcast spectrum incentive auction to favor smaller carriers. The Department's argument is wrong-the critical issue for allocating spectrum is how "use value" differs among wireless carriers, not the presence or absence of foreclosure value. Economic theory suggests the presumption should be for unfettered auctions, not interference as the DOJ recommends. In Section III, we evaluate the predictions from the Department's underlying economic model of competition for the wireless sector, and we show that the agency's proposal to engineer the auction is inconsistent with its own model of mobile wireless competition. In Section IV, we discuss the legal and broader economic defects with the Department's mentality on mobile wireless competition. In the final section, we provide conclusions and policy implications of our findings. 
II. Foreclosure Value and Auction Manipulation
In its twenty-four page Ex Parte filing, the DOJ claims that is not generally opposed to the use of auctions for allocating scare spectrum resources among competing interests. The Department states that the best way to allocate new spectrum resources "is typically to auction them off, on the theory that the highest bidder, i.e., the one with the highest private value, will also generate the greatest benefits to consumers." 11 In essence, the DOJ is arguing that auctions work well when the differences in "private value" are equal to the difference in "use value," where use value to a firm is equal to the profits derived from the increased value to consumers facilitated by the additional spectrum. However, the Department appears concerned that the differences in private values may not simply reflect differences in use values but may also include "foreclosure value." While the DOJ does not define either use value or foreclosure value, a fair reading of its arguments suggests that "use value" is the profits derived from using the spectrum while "foreclosure value" is the profits derived from keeping rivals from using the spectrum. (We provide a formal definition later.) The Department then suggests that the FCC should consider designing an auction so that Sprint and T-Mobile "have an opportunity to acquire [low-frequency] spectrum" and to ensure that AT&T and Verizon "do not foreclose [Sprint and T-Mobile's] access to low-frequency spectrum" 12 by purchasing such resources in the upcoming broadcast spectrum auction. 13 The Department states that it "believes that a set of well-defined, competition-focused rules for spectrum acquisitions, particularly in auctions, would best serve the dual goals of putting spectrum to use quickly and promoting consumer welfare in wireless markets." 14 Absent limits on market participation, Sprint and T-Mobile have the opportunity to acquire more spectrum by offering the highest bid in the auction and thus obtaining some of the broadcast spectrum. However, the Department is concerned that the larger mobile carriers will outbid the smaller carriers because the former's private value is based not only on a "use value" (i.e., the present value of future profits attributable to the additional spectrum) but also a "foreclosure value" of the spectrum. According to the DOJ, this foreclosure value is the "private value of foreclosing competition" 15 and DOJ is concerned that the larger carriers may acquire spectrum not to use it but "solely to keep it from rivals." 16 "Use value" and "foreclosure value" are the crucial concepts in the DOJ's filing, but the terms are used loosely and never formally defined. In light of the strong recommendations made the Department, a failure to provide formal definitions of key terminology (with potentially nebulous meaning) is a serious deficiency. Moreover, had the agency attempted to formalize its argument, it may have seen some important shortfalls in its ideas. Since the DOJ did not define these terms, we will. In the next section, we present an economic model of competition that permits sensible definitions and derivations of use value and foreclosure value. Our model is simple and ignores real world complexities such as spectrum exhaust, but is nonetheless informative in many ways. As we discuss later, adding the complexity of spectrum exhaust to the model further weakens the DOJ's argument for manipulating the auction.
A. Use Value and Foreclosure Value
While the DOJ concedes that auctions are the best way to allocate spectrum since the "one with the greatest private value [] will also generate the greatest benefits to consumers," the agency is concerned that the private value of some firms includes a "foreclosure value" that is not beneficial to consumers. In effect, the DOJ says that auction bids have two possible sources: (1) use value and (2) foreclosure value. While the DOJ fails to formally define either use value or foreclosure value, the Department states that foreclosure value is derived from acquiring spectrum "solely to keep it from rivals." 18 Thus, we may reasonably define "use value" as the change in profits realized by obtaining the spectrum and using it to provide betters services that consumers demand, and "foreclosure value" as the change in profits realized by keeping the spectrum out of the hands of rivals. More formally, let  0 be Firm A's current profit. Now, assume that a new block of spectrum is made available to the market. If this new spectrum is acquired by Firm A, then its profits rise to  Y as it offers better services more efficiently to subscribers. Alternately, if the spectrum is acquired by a rival, then Firm A's profits fall to  N , as the benefits of the new spectrum help the rivals take market share from Firm A. It follows that  Y >  0 >  N . The maximum bid for the spectrum is ( Y - N ), which can be decomposed into For clarity, consider a numerical example. Say, for example, that current profits are $100. If Firm A gets the spectrum, then its profits rise to $130. If a rival gets the spectrum, then Firm A's profits fall to $80. The difference between getting the spectrum and losing the spectrum is $50, and this is the maximum willingness to pay (and maximum bid) of the spectrum in an auction. This private value to Firm A can be decomposed into $30 of use value and $20 of foreclosure value.
B. A Simulation of Use Value and Foreclosure Value
Beginning with these definitions, we can provide more substance to the two types of value using a simulation based on a standard economic model of competition. In keeping with the DOJ's publicly-stated characterization of the domestic mobile wireless market, we assume there are four firms selling a homogeneous product. 19 These firms act as Cournot competitors, an assumption consistent with the DOJ's typical thinking on competition and with the use of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index ("HHI) of industry concentration. There are two large firms (35% market share each) and two smaller firms (about 20% and 10% market shares). These shares are comparable to those currently observed in the U.S. mobile wireless industry for Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and T-Mobile. 20 Given the variation in market share, we employ an asymmetric version of the linear Cournot model where market share differences are based on differences in marginal costs. For the simulation, we assume (arbitrarily and for illustrative purposes only) that the market demand curve is P = 50 -2Q, where P and Q are market price and quantity. The four firms have marginal costs of $6, $6, $11, and $14 (rendering market shares of about 35%, 35%, 20%, and 10%).
Spectrum is an input of production, and presumably more spectrum gives a firm an advantage such as a higher relative demand (e.g., higher quality) or more efficient production (e.g., lower marginal cost). Consistent with the argument by the DOJ that spectrum acquisition "would reduce the marginal cost of service" 21 and given the cost-driven nature of the asymmetric Cournot model, it is most straightforward to assume that additional spectrum lowers the marginal cost of the firm obtaining it. We assume that additional spectrum reduces marginal cost by $1.00, and this reduction will increase the market share and profits of those firms with a lower marginal cost and also lowers industry price and increases industry quantity. Given the nature of the debate, we assume that either the two large or the two small firms get the spectrum. We assume that there is no other reasonable way to impact profits in the same manner as spectrum. The results of the simulation are summarized in Table 1 . The status quo is presented first. As noted above, there are two large firms and two smaller firms; market shares and profits (the  0 for each firm) are provided. Solving for the equilibrium values gives a price of $17.40, an aggregate quantity of 16.3 units, and a consumer surplus of $266. The DOJ argues that the goal 20 
See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile
Services, FCC 13-34, SIXTEENTH REPORT (rel. March 21, 2013) (hereinafter "Sixteenth CMRS Report") at Table 12. 21 DOJ Ex Parte, supra n. 7 at p. 17.
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Page 8 www.phoenix-center.org is to maximize "consumer welfare in wireless markets" 22 and the status quo consumer welfare (producer and consumer surplus) is $422.
As a first scenario, assume that the two large firms get the spectrum and realize a reduction in marginal cost of 1.00. Consequently, the market shares of the larger firms increase, as do their profits. From the table, we see that the profits of the large firms increase by $7 each (the  column in the table), and this $7 represents the use value of the spectrum ( Y - 0 ). That is, the firms will pay up to $7 to obtain the cost-reducing spectrum. The market shares and profits of the smaller firms fall, and the (absolute value of the) reduction in profits ($2.5 and $1.3) are the foreclosure values to the smaller firms ( 0 - N ). In other words, if the small firms could keep the spectrum out of the hands of the larger firms, they stand to gain profits of $2.5 and $1.3, and would pay up to those amounts to keep the spectrum idle. Giving the spectrum to the larger firms results in an increase in market quantity (0.2 units), a reduction in price (-$0.4), an increase in consumer surplus ($6.6) and an increase in consumer welfare ($10.3).
The other option is to give the spectrum to the two smaller firms so that each realizes a 1.00 reduction in marginal cost. Naturally, the market shares of the smaller firms rise as do their profits. This increases in profits for the smaller firms are equal $4 and $2.2, respectively, and these values are the use value of the spectrum to the smaller firms ( Y - 0 ). The profits of the larger firms decline by $4.5 each, and this decline equals the foreclosure value to these firms ( 0 - N ). Giving the spectrum to the larger firms results in an increase in market quantity (0.2 units), a reduction in price (-$0.4), an increase in consumer surplus ($6.6) and an increase in consumer welfare ($3.8). Use and foreclosure values from the simulation are summarized in Table 2 . Private value equals the sum of use and foreclosure value. Using Tables 1 and 2 , we can expose the nature of and defects in the DOJ's argument. As for the DOJ's argument regarding foreclosure value, we can look to Table 2 and see that the larger firms' foreclosure value of $4.5 exceeds the use value of the smaller firms (a maximum of $4). Thus, the larger firms would pay more for the spectrum than the smaller firms even if only to keep the spectrum from being used at all. This case is the sole focus of the DOJ's Ex Parte filing. In effect, the agency has assumed, without any evidence to support that assumption, that the use value to the large firms is zero.
With the information provided by the simulation, the problems with the DOJ's logic can plainly be seen. First, recall that foreclosure value does not equal private value (i.e., willingness to pay); as shown in Figure 1 , private value (i.e., the maximum auction bid) equals use value plus foreclosure value. The presence of foreclosure value says nothing about the efficiency of the auction outcome-all firms have foreclosure values. In Table 2 we see that the larger firms have the highest private values and the highest use value. Thus, the spectrum, if auctioned, is properly licensed to the larger firms. Why? By doing so, the auction maximizes consumer welfare. Consumer welfare-the relevant standard for policy-is lower when the spectrum is given to the smaller firms ($425.7) rather than the large firms ($438.8) . This difference arises because the larger firms are relatively more efficient and serve more customers, and it pays off to direct the spectrum resource to the more efficient and larger firms. Also, market output, price, and consumer surplus are identical between the two options. Thus, there is no "consumer" story for a policy favoring the smaller firms. (Note that the cost reduction for the smaller firms would need to be over three-times larger than the bigger firms for consumer welfare to favor the spectrum going to smaller firms.) Second, the simulation reveals that all firms have foreclosure value. In fact, if we assume that the large firms use the spectrum relatively more effectively to reduce marginal cost than do the small firms (a reasonable assumption), say increasing their cost reduction to $2 instead of $1, then the foreclosure of Firm 3 (now $4.80) actually exceeds the foreclosure value of the larger firms ($4.50). So, while the DOJ is focused on the foreclosure value of the larger firms, it may well be that the foreclosure value of AT&T and Verizon is less than that the foreclosure value of Sprint and T-Mobile. Foreclosure value is not a motivation for manipulating or abandoning auctions. Foreclosure value merely arises from the scarcity of resources and is thus nearly ubiquitous in market settings. If all four firms obtained spectrum, then there is no foreclosure value, and absent a minimum bid, no auction revenue. Foreclosure value is the inevitable byproduct of a revenue-producing auction-that is, there must be a risk of losing to induce bidding activity. This fact is crucial to scrutinizing the DOJ's arguments. The DOJ claims to embrace auctions as the best way to allocate spectrum, except when foreclosure values affect bids. Yet, foreclosure value affects all bids, so the Department's argument is, in effect, a call to abandon spectrum auctions.
Third, note that in Table 1 the HHI increases when the spectrum is given to the large firms and decreases when given to the small firms. However, consumer welfare is highest if the spectrum is given to the large firms. Thus, the simulation shows that changes in the HHI are not a reliable indicator of changes in consumer welfare.
Perhaps the key insight provided by the simulation is this: it is the differences in use value, not merely the presence or absence of foreclosure value, which determines the efficiency of the auction results.
Page 10 of 21 And unlike the DOJ, we do not make strong recommendations to the FCC about its spectrum screen, but merely issue a word of caution on the blind acceptance of the Department's recommendations that rest on a demonstrably incomplete conceptual framework.
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Also, while the simulation is based on a rather simple model, we believe it (or something like it) to be rigorous enough to serve the role of establishing a presumption with regard to spectrum policy. In its filing, the DOJ argues that the FCC should rig the auction to favor Sprint and T-Mobile "[a]bsent compelling evidence that the largest incumbent carriers are already using their existing spectrum licenses efficiently and their networks are still capacityconstrained...." 29 Note, however, that the simulation above does not assume capacity constraints. Additional spectrum, whether the firm is under a capacity constraint or not, has use value, so the DOJ's argument regarding foreclosure and use values improperly hinges on capacity shortages. As we show above, society is better off if the spectrum goes to the larger and more efficient providers of service, since basic economic analysis suggests that the use value of the bigger firms is larger than for the smaller firms. This analysis seems to support the presumption that an unfettered auction is best and, as such, "absent compelling evidence" that the use value of the small firms is greater than the use value of large firms, there should be no favoritism designed into the auction.
D. Protections Against Foreclosure
We stress that while theory permits a formal conceptualization of use value and foreclosure value, this exercise does not say anything about the practical ability to implement such a strategy. The FCC's build-out and substantial service requirements would make a foreclosure strategy very difficult to implement. 30 In fact, this "foreclosure" argument has been levied at wireless carriers for years, typically in the form of an alleged "hoarding" strategy. The FCC has conducted studies of spectrum exhaust and evaluated the "hoarding spectrum" claim. Just recently, the agency concluded in its National Broadband Plan that spectrum exhaust was real and that there was no evidence that wireless carriers are hoarding spectrum. 31 
III. The DOJ's Model of Wireless Competition is Inconsistent with its Proposal
Foreclosure is the primary focus of the DOJ's Ex Parte filing, but it is possible to levy additional criticisms related to the theoretical underpinnings of the Department's analysis. For example, the Department's filing includes sufficient dicta to permit the formulation of its implicit (if not explicit) model of mobile wireless competition. Since the DOJ devotes a significant portion of its filing claiming expertise in market analysis about the telecommunications sector, it is worth assessing what the Department's implicit economic model says about its recommendations.
First, as is always the case with the DOJ, the agency assumes that the more competitors there are, the more competition there is and the lower are prices. 33 Statements in its filing such as "the fewer competitors in a market," 34 "significant national concentration," 35 and "highly concentrated industry," 36 as well as its analysis in its complaint challenging the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, 37 reveal the underlying competitive interaction assumed by the Department. This "head count" approach to competition, which permits the relevance of the HirschmanHerfindahl Index ("HHI") of industry concentration, is derived from the economic model of Cournot Competition, which has the property of declining prices and profits as the number of http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20110317/capital-markets/nab-ctia-cea-spar-over-incentiveauctions); see also Remarks of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, The Clock is Ticking (March 16, 2011) ("The looming spectrum shortage is real-and it is the alleged hoarding that is illusory.") (available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-305225A1.pdf).
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Contrary to the DOJ's simple textbook "headcount" approach, it is important to recognize that in industries such as telecommunications which are characterized by high fixed and sunk costs, intense competition between a few competitors may render market performance good or better than weak competitive interactions among many competitors. Second, the DOJ recognizes that the industry is facing spectrum exhaust. For example, the agency's filing states that "changes in technology and demand have made spectrum a critically scarce resource" 40 driven by an "exploding demand for wireless broadband." 41 In response to this scarcity, the Department opines that "carriers will need to acquire additional spectrum and make more efficient use of spectrum if they are to respond to growing consumer demand for a wide array of wireless services and devices," 42 and it encourages the FCC to "reallocate a considerable array of spectrum and make it available for mobile wireless services." 43 Plainly, the DOJ believes that the mobile wireless industry faces a capacity constraint and needs more spectrum, a scarcity condition frequently referred to as spectrum exhaust. 44 This position is consistent with the National Broadband Plan, released in 2010, which concluded that the present inventory of commercial spectrum represents "just a fraction of the amount that will be necessary to match growing demand." 45 Id. at p. 9.
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Notwithstanding the above, the Department appears to be of two minds on the issue of spectrum exhaust. See, e.g., DOJ Ex Parte, id. at p. 12 ("Absent compelling evidence that the largest incumbent carriers are already using their existing spectrum licenses efficiently and their networks are still capacity-constrained ...."); id. at p. 17 ("in the course of investigating the proposed merger between AT&T and T-Mobile, the Department cast doubt on the parties' claims that there were few alternatives to deal with spectrum shortages.") If that is indeed the case, then it is interesting to note that subsequent to abandoning the acquisition of T-Mobile, AT&T believed it necessary to engage on a spectrum buying spree in an effort to satisfy its spectrum needs. See, e.g., M. Dano, AT&T to Buy Spectrum, 21,000 Customers from C Spire's Corr Subsidiary, FIERCEWIRELESS (April 5, 2013) ("Since the 2011 collapse of AT&T's $39 billion bid for T-Mobile USA, the carrier has been working to acquire spectrum from a variety of other sources.") (available at: http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/att-buys-spectrum-21000-customers-c-spires-corrsubsidiary/2013-04-05). Moreover, AT&T is not alone in its quest for more spectrum. According to the same article, since the time of the AT&T/T-Mobile deal fell through, "Verizon Wireless paid $3.9 billion to acquire AWS spectrum licenses from a group of cable companies. And T-Mobile USA is hoping to merge with flat-rate rival MetroPCS in order to bolster its nascent LTE network with Metro's spectrum." www.phoenix-center.org "[w]ithout action, demand for spectrum will soon outstrip supply.… If we don't tackle the spectrum crunch now, network congestion will grow, and consumer frustration will grow with it." 46 Even the White House is concerned, concluding that there is a "current[] spectrum crunch that will hinder future innovation." 47 In fact, the broadcast spectrum auction at issue is one attempt of many to aid in the alleviation of spectrum exhaust.
Third, the Department assumes that spectrum is subject to a type of scale economy, in that "twice the spectrum may under certain conditions provide over twice the amount of capacity." 48 In fact, the DOJ advises the FCC to consider whether these scale effects are sufficient to offset the risk of "foreclosure value." 49 These three assumptions-Cournot Competition, spectrum exhaust, and scale effects in spectrum use-provide a foundation for a theoretical model of competition in the wireless industry. The predictions from such a model of competition have been derived and presented in a paper we recently published in the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL entitled Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust. 50 Unfortunately, at least for the DOJ, when you model prices under these assumptions, you get a result entirely at odds with the Department's purported expert take on the question of spectrum allocation in the mobile wireless sector. Specifically, if wireless firms face a binding spectrum constraint, then using standard models of Cournot competition, fewer firms will lead to lower process, less congestion, and higher qualityturning the standard antitrust view that more competitors leads to lower prices on its head. The prediction of the theory is illustrated in Figure 1 ; the model's parameters are assigned arbitrary values to produce the figure. 52 Both the standard and the capacity-constrained (i.e., "spectrum exhaust") Cournot outcomes are illustrated. In Panel A, we have equilibrium industry quantity (Q*) measured on the vertical axis and the number of firms (n), or the inverse of the HHI given symmetry, along the horizontal axis. The standard Cournot equilibrium quantity (without a capacity constraint) is illustrated by the line segment labeled XYZ in Panel A. As n rises, quantity rises-the standard result. The line segment labeled XYW illustrates the equilibrium quantity when the capacity constraint is binding, where it is assumed (for illustrative purposes) that the capacity constraint is binding at duopoly (n = 2 at point Y). The figure shows that output rises as the number of firms increases from monopoly to duopoly, but then output falls (along segment YW) when the number of firms exceeds duopoly. So, while the standard Cournot-type framework holds that six firms have lower prices than two firms, under a spectrum constraint this need not be true. Indeed, for the chosen parameters, the six-firm outcome is essentially the same as the monopoly outcome. In Panel B, we observe what happens to equilibrium price as the number of firms increase. In the standard Cournot case, price falls as the number of firms increases (line segment XYZ). Once the spectrum constraint is binding (n = 2), however, price rises as the number of firms increases, following line segment XYW. With a binding constraint, the more firms there are in the industry, the higher are prices. Clearly, the spectrum constraint invalidates the standard thinking on the relationship between prices and concentration-if the constraint is binding, then fewer firms leads to lower prices. 53 (Note that if we assume there is no scale effect in spectrum, then after the constraint is binding-at point Y in the figure-an increase in the number of firms has no effect on quantity and price. In such a case, the line segments YW would be horizontal, implying a larger number of firms, or a lower HHI, has no effect on price or quantity.)
These figures illustrate clearly the primary results from adding a spectrum constraint to the standard Cournot model. If the constraint is binding, then equilibrium quantity is lower and the price is higher as the number of competitors increases. Obviously, the presence of a spectrum crunch requires substantial modification to the standard competitive model used in most cases by antitrust and regulatory agencies. As of yet, the DOJ has not modified its thinking on spectrum policy and mobile wireless competition to better fit its views (and those of the FCC) on the supply-and demand-side conditions of the market.
Importantly, the unquestioned findings in Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust do not suggest that the DOJ's near exclusive reliance on the predictions of Cournot Competition is improper; instead, our paper suggests that if the DOJ insists on relying upon that assumed model of competition-and the DOJ appears incapable of thinking about competition in any other way-then the "critically scarce resource" of spectrum means that more firms are not going to produce lower prices, but may instead increase prices, reduce quality, and curb innovation. If the Justice Department is correct in asserting that the "goal in assigning licenses to spectrum … should be to ensure that it generates the greatest ultimate benefit to the consumer of those services," 54 then the DOJ's recommended course of action is inconsistent with its own depiction of the relevant conditions facing the industry. 
IV. The Design of the Wireless Telecommunications Market
Quite plainly, the Justice Department's recommendation to the Commission is for the agency to seriously consider using the spectrum screen or auction rules to equalize competition among mobile wireless competitors. Explicitly, the Department views "the design of the wireless telecommunications market" 55 as its responsibility and, in this particular case, states its belief that spectrum should be allocated "to enable smaller or additional providers to mount stronger challenges to large wireless incumbents." 56 Without belaboring the point, we now summarize the legal problems with the DOJ's "responsibility to design markets" perspective.
The case law is clear-for both the FCC and the DOJ-that competition policy is designed to protect competition and not individual competitors. 57 This maxim is particularly true for the FCC, given the well-known fact that stakeholders regularly seek to use the regulatory process to hamstring a competitor. 58 For example, in the 1981 case of Hawaiian Telephone v. FCC, 59 the D.C. Circuit overturned an FCC grant of Section 214 authority for service between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii because it found that the Commission had engaged in an ad hoc approach which improperly aimed at "equalizing competition among competitors." The D.C. Circuit stated that FCC public interest analysis must be more than an inquiry into "whether the balance of equities and opportunities among competing carriers suggests a change." The court found that it was "all too embarrassingly apparent that the Commission has been thinking about competition, not in terms primarily as to its benefit to the public, but specifically equalizing competition among competitors." 60 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97 S. Ct. 690, 697, 50 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 82 S. Ct. 1502 , 1521 , 8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962 The DOJ's recommendation is exactly that-a recommendation. The FCC is not bound to act in lockstep with the DOJ. While the regulatory agency and the antitrust authorities share many of the same goals, the two have different core missions. As the D.C. Circuit first stated in 1968 and later reaffirmed in 1980 in United States v. FCC, the "basic goal of governmental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmental regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same-to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible." 62 According to (now) Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, these goals are "low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production methods." 63 Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter opined over fifty years ago, " [t] here can be no doubt that competition is a relevant factor in weighing the public interest." 64 Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1112 , 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ) ("equalization of competition is not itself a sufficient basis for Commission action"). One of the counter-arguments to this position is the often misguided notion that the naked "protection of competitors" is analytically the equivalent to attempting to promote tangible new entry into a market currently dominated by a monopoly incumbent. It is not. As the FCC's former chief economist argued, it is very "important that the playing field should be leveled upwards, not downwards" because "rules that forbid a firm from exploiting efficiencies just because its rivals cannot do likewise" do nothing but harm, rather than improve, consumer welfare. Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1996) . In highly concentrated industries, the focus of policy should be on regulation that promotes competitive entry, rather than regulation that "protects competition." The later will often turn into the mere protection of the private interests of competitors.
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United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Northern Natural Gas co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ).
63
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1 st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991) ; see also Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2003) ("Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic context is an awareness of the significance of regulation. As we have noted, 'careful account must be taken of the pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry.'") 64 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1953) ; see also Northern Natural Gas v. FPC, supra n. 62, 399 F.2d at 961 (emphasis supplied) ("In short, the antitrust laws are merely another tool which a regulatory agency employs to a greater or lesser degree to give 'understandable content' to the broad statutory concept of the 'public interest.'"); United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353, 364 (D.D.C. 1980 ) (Green, J.) (it is "not appropriate to distinguish between Communications Act standards and antitrust standards" because "both the FCC, in its enforcement of the The case law's requirement that competition policy should be focused on "its benefit to the public" and not on "equalizing competition among competitors" is compelling. 68 Indeed, read correctly, legal precedent dictates that that the FCC should not target particular market structures, but rather consider what structure will provide consumers with quality services at reasonable prices. Although buried in its recent Sixteenth CMRS Report, the Commission has at least recognized this basic maxim, noting that:
Competitive rivalry among providers is desirable not as an end in itself, but rather as a means of bringing tangible benefits to consumers, such as lower prices, higher quality, and greater choice of services. 69 In contrast, the DOJ-with its publicly stated "market design" perspective that the optimal market structure of the mobile wireless communications market is four roughly identical competitors-has not. 70 The error in the DOJ's thinking is that equalizing competition is the same as maximizing the benefits of competition. Homogeneity among products or firms is not necessarily good for consumers, and differences in spectrum holdings or other assets may lead to different business plans (e.g., low price or non-contract plans). Variety may better serve the heterogeneous preferences of consumers and thus improve consumer welfare. Also, our paper Wireless Competition and Spectrum Exhaust, discussed above, clearly illustrates the danger of such of a heavy reliance on "head count" models of competition. 71 Indeed, the DOJ's steady reliance on "head counts" and homogenous firms demonstrates why the final authority for telecommunications policy rests not at the DOJ but at the FCC-the Department's thinking is too general and ignores the harsh economic realities specific to providing telecommunications services and the complexities of managing scare spectrum resources.
V. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Auctions for spectrum are based on the idea that efficiency is served by surrendering to the market the task of allocating spectrum based on private values, thereby rejecting the comparative hearing or lottery approaches of the past. However, for federal agencies intent on "designing markets," the auctioning of unencumbered spectrum to the highest bidder from an open pool of participants has no appeal. We have already seen in the C-Block rules for the 700
68
Hawaiian Telephone, supra n. 59 at 775-76.
69
Sixteenth CMRS Report, supra n. 20 at ¶ 242.
70
See DOJ Complaint, supra n. 19. 71 See supra n. 50.
